the board in order to maintain a positive image and secure future funding, as well as to prevent low-performing departments from being phased out. In such a case, it seems likely that an arrangement to pass everybody would be welcomed by the faculty.
Some Deliberations
The expansion of higher education in China has allowed a record number of people to enroll in college, and has brought benefits to society as a whole. Investments undertaken by the central government have raised the quality and international recognition of educational institutions on the Mainland. I would, however, argue that graduation being almost guaranteed is acting as an impediment to their further development.
As it stands, elite universities enroll the bulk of their students through the gaokao (the university entrance exam) and Independent Recruitment. Although the latter method allows universities a more flexible approach to their student intake, not relying on one single determining score, it is also prone to corruption. The most notable case in recent years is that of Cai Rongsheng. During his eight-year tenure as head of the admissions office at Renmin University of China, he took in more than RMB 23 million (US$34 million) in bribes for enrolling particular students. According to the Beijing Morning Post, places at renowned universities can be priced as high as RMB 1 million (US$150,000). Independent Recruitment has become a channel for unqualified high school graduates with strong official connections to get into good universities, where they will graduate regardless of their efforts. Under such circumstances, assessment systems designed to weed out low-performing students during the course of their four-year degrees are unlikely to be implemented.
In the case of Renmin University at least, Independent Recruitment has been scaled down considerably since the days of Cai Rongsheng. As numbers from the admissions office show, 192 students were admitted through that process in 2016 (out of 2,797 freshmen in total), which is considerably less than in 2012, when that number stood at 550, around 20 percent of newly enrolled students at the time.
Given the huge pool of qualified candidates, it seems quite imaginable that these universities could achieve graduation rates at the current level, without the need for any particular accommodation toward that end. This would presuppose a transparent, merit-based admission process free of corruption.
As far as provincial universities and colleges are concerned, I am of the opinion that they would benefit from strict graduation requirements to an even greater extent. As of now, the impetus towards numerical growth in enrollment and majors coincides with a mandate to keep graduation rates high as well, independent of actual student performance. A paradigm shift instituted at a number of provincial universities, placing strict value on the quality of graduates instead of their quantity, would help to raise the value of their degrees and alleviate the hierarchical nature which characterizes Chinese higher education.
It is worth noting that a handful of newly established universities that break with established patterns in student recruitment and curricular requirements do in fact exist, among them ShanghaiTech University and Southern University of Science and Technology. It remains to be seen if their graduation practice will differ from, or fall in line with, the vast majority. T he trajectory of Iranian higher education after the 1979 revolution can be divided into three phases. First, under the revolutionary era (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) , Iranian higher education underwent a first wave of Islamization with the onset of the Cultural Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) . Next, followed a period of reconstruction and political development between 1998 and 2004 . During that period, the regime released universities from ideological pressures, allowing them to grow more independent from the state. The third period, the "hard-liner era" (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) , saw another round of Islamization and recentralization of the universities.
Higher Education during Revolution and War
Iranian universities enjoyed a brief moment of autonomy as the Pahlavi monarchy came to an end, but their role as political hotspots during the revolution quickly led the government to assert control. Immediately following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, government officials implemented policies intended to regulate and "purify" universities, to cleanse them of any trace of the Pahlavi regime.
University autonomy eroded under the Cultural Revolution Plan. All universities closed for three years until 1982, in order to be "cleansed" of both political and reli-gious opposition. During that time, the Cultural Revolution headquarters was the main body managing and directing the Islamization project. The council emphasized two stages in Islamizing universities. First, it installed a pro-Islam curriculum by purging institutions of any Western or Eastern influence. During the second stage, it dealt with the physical construction of the newly Islamized universities: all aspects of the institutions were to be modified to mirror Islamic principles and criteria. A variety of organizations such as the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution (SCCR) were set up in order to oversee and govern the Islamization project of universities and expand it to the entire Iranian culture.
The Construction and Reform Era (1989-2004)
The technocratic government under Hashemi Rafsanjani, who took power after the Iran-Iraq War, perceived universities as the primary resource to train officials for the state bureaucracy. The Rafsanjani administration emphasized takhasoos (technical expertise) over taahhod (ideological commitment), which had dominated after the first Cultural Revolution. Rafsanjani's pragmatism resulted in the dramatic expansion of higher education in Iran. During that era, many private universities were established around the country. Enrollment in state universities increased from 407,693 in 1988 to 1,192,329 in 1996. This trend continued under Kathami's reformist administration (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) , which saw an increase in university autonomy and a relaxation of their political atmosphere. Khatami's government tried to restructure the higher education system and increase its independence from government. In 2000, the ministry of culture and higher education was changed to "ministry of science, research, and technology" (MSRT), emphasizing its reach over research as well as education. The following year, universities were given more independence in the preparation of curricula and syllabi. In addition, in 2002, they were allowed to hire professors as opposed to accepting state appointments. Finally, universities were permitted to choose their administrations, including deans of faculties and presidents, through an election process.
As in the Rafsanjani era, under Khatami student enrollment expanded rapidly, increasing from 1,404,880 in 2000 to 2,117,471 in 2004. The number of female students in universities also increased steadily. Backed by the students themselves, reformists opened up the political debate in universities and encouraged the political participation of students, a policy that was attacked by conservatives. This expansion of political freedom among students led to their strong democratic desire to challenge the unelected bodies of the political regime, as shown by the student uprisings in 1999 and 2003, suppressed by the militia and other vigilante groups.
Although the state bureaucracy strove to implement reformist policies, it was met with relentless opposition by Iran's supreme leader and the conservative wing, who tried to block reformist programs, thwart student movements, and continue to Islamize universities. In 1997, the SCCRdominated by conservatives and appointed by the Supreme leader-supported the establishment of a new Council for Islamizing Educational Institutes (CIEI). The CIEI ratified many regulations, including a doctrine entitled "Principles of Islamic Universities," in December 1998. According to this document, the Islamization of universities would be achieved through six different channels: professors, students, curriculum and syllabi, cultural programming, educational programming, and school management. The policies, which were rejected by reformists, were implemented under the following hard-liner administration.
Hard-Liner Era (2005-2012)
An authoritarian populist, Ahmadinejad simultaneously expanded higher education and political control over universities. The number of students reached to 4 million by 2013. At the same time, his government revoked the relative autonomy of universities, recentralized the higher education system, and brought universities under political control. During that period, the government's efforts to control universities intensified dramatically. The MSRT, dominated by hard-liner scholars, implemented all the CIEI regulations that had been proposed to further the Islamization of universities.
The recentralization of the higher education system occurred at several levels. At the administrative level, the MSRT, not the faculties, selected university presidents. The Ahmadinejad government replaced many esteemed academic staff with fundamentalists who believed deeply in university Islamization. The MSRT also replaced university management regulations that had been in place for 18 years with the mandate that university presidents would select deputies and heads of faculties who would implement university Islamization. A gender segregation policy was aggressively implemented; universities were also required to expand the implementation of moral policing and to create mosques and Islamic seminaries. In 2007, to enroll proregime loyalists, the government removed the autonomy of the universities in the hiring process and recruited ideologically driven lecturers. During the Ahmadinejad administration, student admissions were similarly centralized and the admission of doctoral students came under the control of the MSRT. This control helped the government prevent politically active students from continuing their education and Number 90: Summer 2017 facilitated the access of pro-regime students to postgraduate studies. Universities also lost their autonomy to design and prepare their curricula. The Committee on Promotion of Human Sciences Textbooks was established to "purify" university textbooks. Many observers interpreted these efforts as a second Cultural Revolution, which has eroded the quality of higher education in Iran.
Conclusion
Controlling and Islamizing universities has been one of the primary concerns of the Islamic republic since its inception. This has culminated in two Cultural Revolutions that occurred in the 1980s and 2000s respectively. These policies paved the way for a massive brain drain and undermined the quality of education, notably in the humanities and social sciences. Despite these efforts, the state was not successful in creating an Islamic university. The expansion of universities and student numbers, the growth of information technologies, and the fragmentation and deideologization of part of the political elites are among the reasons why the project of islamization of Iranian universities has been a relative failure. DOI: http://dx.doi/org/10.6017/ihe.2017.90.9930
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